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NOTE
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS TO
"CHILDREN" AS INCLUDING
ILLEGITIMATES-A CHANGE IN
WISCONSIN LAW?
A testamentary disposition to "my children" or to "the child
or children of a deceased child," although frequently used, may not
sufficiently express the intent of the testator to avoid a will con-
struction problem at the time of the testator's death. The circum-
stances surrounding the testator at the time he executed his will
and the existence of illegitimate children in his line of descent at
the time of his death may cloud the testator's intent and dictate a
judicial construction of the words "child" and "children." Al-
though problems of this nature are not new, it is believed that the
permissive attitudes of today's society coupled with the contempo-
rary trend of securing the rights of illegitimate children will result
in a substantial increase in the number of times this problem will
occur and the number of times the issue will be raised as to whether
an illegitimate child is entitled to take under a testamentary dispo-
sition to "children." It is the intent of this article to provide an
analysis of the current status of Wisconsin law in this area by
focusing on the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision in In re Trust
of Parsons,' and by tracing the development of Wisconsin law
leading up to that decision. Mention will also be made of the
relationship of the common-law to this issue; however, no attempt
will be made to justify, criticize or distinguish the multitude of
cases from foreign jurisdictions on this subject.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT
At common-law it was well established that a devise or bequest
to "children" did not include illegitimates unless the testator mani-
fested his intention to the contrary. The word "child" or "chil-
dren," as used in a will or trust prima facie meant a legitimate child
or legitimate children unless the context of the instrument was such
as to require a contrary construction or the surrounding circum-
stances indicated, by necessity, that the testator intended to refer
to other than legitimate children. This view was based upon the
theory that an illegitimate child was nullius filius, the son of no-
1. 56 Wis. 2d 613, 203 N.W.2d 40 (1973).
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body, and that he could not inherit; therefore, the courts concluded
that when a testator used the word "child" or "children" he used
it to the exclusion of illegitimates.2
The Wisconsin Supreme Court discussed the application of
these common-law principles in Will of Scholl.' The issue raised
in that case was whether the testatrix, by the use of the word
"children," intended to include as an alternate beneficiary the ille-
gitimate great-grandchild of a sister mentioned in her will if that
sister predecesed her. The court initially recognized that the "ordi-
nary meaning" of the word "children" excluded illegitimates and
that ". . . a general bequest to children, without something to
clearly give to the term an extended meaning, includes legitimates
only." 4
However, the court indicated that the intention of the testatrix
was controlling and noted the following in relation to the applica-
tion of the common-law rule in Wisconsin:
The rule at common law under which illegitimates were not
deemed to have any inheritable blood from their father or mother
and could not be given any by the marriage of the parents, finds
no place in our system. In its stead the more humane policy of
the civil law has been adopted, a policy which considers justice
to the innocent as outweighing the controlling idea . . . of the
common law; the discouragement of illegitimacy. The import-
ance of the latter is by no means diminished in legal contempla-
tion, but the injustice and futility of punishing the innocent result
of illicit commerce as an effectual warning against the sin of it,
is recognized in the more practical and intelligent system under
which we live. That situation, which we may reasonably assume
the testatrix had in mind in making the testamentary disposition
of her property, is quite persuasive in determining what she in-
tended. In view of it, less evidence than under the old system will
sufficiently show that the intention was to include illegitimate
children in giving to a class as children, the mother of the class
being the inheritable blood that induced the bequest; but the
existence of the policy referred to cannot do away entirely with
the rule that the general term cannot include the particular class
unless the intention to do so appears by necessary implication.
2. See Robins and Deak, The Familial Property Rights of Illegitimate Children: A
Comparative Study, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 308 (1930); 4 W. Bowe and D. Parker, Page On
Wills § 34.20 (rev. ed. 1961); 10 AM. JUR. 2d Bastards § 137 (1963); Annot., 34 A.L.R.2D
4 (1954).
3. 100 Wis. 650, 76 N.W. 616 (1898).
4. Id. at 659, 76 N.W. at 619.
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It was not the policy of the common law alone that led to the
rule. So we are not permitted to say that, the policy being
changed, the rule has ceased to exist. The plain, ordinary mean-
ing of the word still is, presumptively, legitimate children, but the
inference arising from its use, unexplained, is somewhat weak-
ened so that evidence or circumstances of less weight than before
are deemed sufficient to rebut it. [Emphasis added]5
The court later stressed the fact that any reasonable evidence
of the testator's intent to include illegitimates would be sufficient
to rebut the now weakened common-law presumption. It is inter-
esting to note that the court, as early as 1898, was sensitive to the
potentially harsh common-law rule and was willing to attempt to
alleviate some of the potential inequities of excluding illegitimate
children from testamentary dispositions.
In Estate of Sander, the court construed a bequest to "... my
nearest blood relations, if there be any. . . ." Although this case
did not directly address itself to the construction of the word "chil-
dren" as it relates to illegitimates, it did provide a concise policy
statement of the court's position in this area:
The offense of the parents in the case of an illegitimate off-
spring under the humane laws of our day is not visited upon the
children to the extent of preventing them from taking under a will
regardless of the ordinary meaning of the term "blood relatives,"
or "child," or "heirs," or "next of kin" at common-law. The
intention of a testator as regards illegitimates is to be respected
and effectuated by courts the same as his intention respecting
lawfull issue.7
In light of this statement, the court concluded that the words used
by the testator in his will, when it was reasonably certain that he
knew he had no relatives of his own blood other than descendants
of his illegitimate brother, were intended to refer to those descen-
dants; therefore, the court held that the children of the testator's
illegitimate brother were intended beneficiaries under his will.
In 1931, in Will of Kaufer,8 the Wisconsin Supreme Court was
faced with the construction of the following paragraph in a will:
Nineteenth. I Nathan Kaufer give and bequeath the sum of
five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) to the children of my deceased
5. Id. at 660, 76 N.W. at 619.
6. 126 Wis. 660, 105 N.W. 1064 (1906).
7. Id. at 666, 105 N.W. at 1066.
8. 203 Wis. 299, 234 N.W. 504 (1931); see also 30 MIcH. L. REv. 481 (1931-32).
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sister, Betty Kaufer Friend, to be divided equally among those
living at the time of my death, including the child or children of
a deceased child by right of representation. [Emphasis added]'
The petition for the construction of this paragraph alleged that
Betty Kaufer Friend was survived by only one child, Johanna
Freund, a daughter, and that Johanna predeceased the testator,
Nathan Kaufer, and left surviving only two illegitimate children
who were the claimants of the legacy in paragraph "Nineteenth."
The petitioners also alleged that Nathan Kaufer was fully cogni-
zant of these facts during his lifetime. In light of these allegations
the issue was raised as to whether the claimants were "children"
within the meaning of the bequest.
The court recognized that the weight of authority indicated that
a devise or bequest to a "child" or to "children" primafacie meant
legitimate children. However, the Supreme Court reversed the trial
court, which had denied the legacy to the claimants, and remanded
the case for an elaboration of the facts alleged in the petition in
reference to the knowledge of the testator as to the existence of the
illegitimate children. The court concluded:
If the facts alleged in. . . the petition are conceded, or if they
are susceptible of proof, they are sufficient to rebut the presump-
tion that legitimates only were intended, providing they are
shown to have existed at the time of the will or its republication.10
It would appear by this statement that the court was attempting
to establish a test which could be used to determine whether the
presumption of legitimates arising from the use of the word
"child" or "children" had been rebutted. Although the elements of
this test were not explicit, a reading of the case seems to indicate
that the presumption could be rebutted by showing that the testator
had knowledge of the existence of the illegitimate children, that
this knowledge existed at the time the will was executed or repub-
lished and that the illegitimate children were the only potential
beneficiaries of the bequest.
Dissatisfaction with the decision in Kaufer was expressed by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court thirty-two years later in Estate of
Bohnsack." The issue in this case was whether two illegitimate
children could claim the remainder of a testamentary trust estab-
9. Will of Kaufer, 203 Wis. 299, 300, 234 N.W. 5041 (1931).
10. Id. at 304, 234 N.W. at 505.
II. 20 Wis. 2d 448, 122 N.W.2d 443 (1963).
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lished for the benefit of their mother for her life with the balance
of the corpus and accumulated income at the mother's death going
to the issue of the mother if any survived her. It was established
that the testatrix was aware of the existence of the two illegitimate
children of her daughter who was the life beneficiary of the trust.
The court noted that pursuant to Will of Kaufer and Will afSchohl
it had a responsibility to determine the testatrix's intention as
expressed in her will and recognized the legal proposition that a
bequest to children or issue presumptively referred to legitimate
rather than illegitimate children. In relation to these two points the
court stated:
Notwithstanding the trend toward ameliorating the treatment
of illegitimates, it is still presumed under the law of Wisconsin
that a bequest to children or issue excludes illegitimates unless a
contrary intention can be ascertained to upset such presump-
tion.12
These general principles were consistant with the development
of the law in this area up to the time of this case; however, from
here the court took issue with the test established in Will of Kaufer
as to the type of evidence deemed sufficient to rebut the presump-
tion that a bequest to "children" excludes illegitimates. Although
the court stated that it was cognizant of the trend toward greater
recognition of the potential interests of illegitimate children, it
firmly indicated that the standard set in Will of Kaufer for rebut-
ting the presumption was too low. Initially, the court indicated that
it would be erroneous to contend that mere knowledge on the part
of the testator of the birth of an illegitimate child would be suffi-
cient to rebut the presumption that a bequest to "children" or
"issue" meant only legitimate issue. In light of this concept and
the court's conclusion that the standard set in Will of Kaufer was
also inadequate, the Wisconsin Supreme Court took advantage of
this opportunity to establish a new test to determine whether the
existing common-law presumption had been rebutted. By first re-
ferring to Kaufer, the court prefaced and then stated the new test
as follows:
When petitioners in the case [Will of Kaufer] alleged that the
testator knew that the deceased sister was survived only by illegi-
timates, the court said that this was "sufficient to rebut the pre-
sumption that legitimates only were intended." We are obliged
12. Id. at 451, 122 N.W.2d at 445.
1973]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
to modify the application of the foregoing quotation so that it
will be applicable only when the existence of the illegitimate issue
was known to the testator and also (1) the illegitimate was part
of the family circle or (2) was otherwise recognized by the testa-
tor as an object of his natural bounty. [Emphasis added] 3
It should be remembered that the primary purpose of any test
established by the court must be to determine the intent of the
testator as initially required by the court in Will of Scholl. There-
fore, the requirement of knowledge on the part of the testator
coupled with the "family circle" or "natural bounty" element must
be viewed as the court's interpretation of the factors which will
most accurately reflect the testator's desire to include illegitimate
children as potential beneficiaries.
This relatively clear and unambiguous test remained unchal-
lenged and unchanged until recently when the Wisconsin Supreme
Court heard and decided In re Trust of Parsons.4
11. PARSONS-PERHAPS MORE THAN A NEw TEST
The court in Parsons was concerned with the construction of
the word "children" as it was used in a paragraph of the last will
of Maude A. Parsons. The testatrix had executed her will on Nov-
ember 3, 1950, and she died on December 19, 1960. Paragraph
Third of her will provided that the residue of her estate was to be
placed in trust and divided into two equal shares, one share for
each of her two children, Lois Alberta Tice and Allen Trubshaw
Parsons. Each child was to receive the net income of his or her
share for life, and Paragraph Third (c) of the testatrix's will pro-
vided:
At the death of each of my said two children, or at my death
if either of my said children shall fail to survive me, I direct that
my trustee divide such deceased child's share of my trust estate
into as many shares as such deceased child shall leave children
him suriving. One such share shall be set aside for each child
(hereinafter referred to as grandchild), of such deceased child of
mine. . . . [Emphasis added] 5
On September 8, 1969, Alan Trubshaw Parsons died leaving
four surviving children. One of these children, Allen Timothy Par-
13. Id. at 452, 122 N.W.2d at 445.
14. 56 Wis. 2d 613, 203 N.W.2d 40 (1973).
15. Id. at 615, 203 N.W.2d at 41; see also Will of Maude A. Parsons, Respondents'
Brief, Supplemental Appendix p. 102.
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sons born February 16, 1967, was determined by the court to be
an illegitimate child of Alan Trubshaw Parsons. In light of these
facts the issue as to whether Allen Timothy Parsons, an illegiti-
mate child born after the death of the testatrix, was to share in the
distribution of the testamentary trust established by Maude A.
Parsons.
The court initially pointed out that absent statutes and legal
presumptions there was nothing in the record which would have
indicated that Maude A. Parsons, if she had lived, would have
treated the illegitimate child any differently than the legitimate
children of Alan Trubshaw Parsons. However, the court recog-
nized, as it had in the past, that the common-law rule accepted by
the court in Will of Scholl was applicable and that evidence rebut-
ting the presumed intent of the testatrix was essential if the illegiti-
mate child was to share in the trust distribution. In light of this
situation, the court was faced with the problem of applying the
Bohnsack test to a situation where the testatrix died before the
interested illegitimate child was born.
It should be noted here that in both Kaufer and Bohnsack the
testator was alive when the illegitimate children involved were
born; therefore, the facts in this case presented a significantly dif-
ferent question for the court to resolve. For the first time, the court
was faced with a situation where knowledge by the testator of the
existence of the illegitimate child was impossible. This factual set-
ting presented a problem for the court since one of the elements
of the Bohnsack test required that the existence of the illegitimate
issue be known to the testator. Since this situation apparently
provided the court with an opportunity to reevaluate its position
in Bohnsack, it attempted to resolve the problem by taking another
step away from "the injustice of the harsh common-law rule," and
decided to follow the "trend toward ameliorating the treatment of
illegitimates."' 6
To accomplish this goal the court interpreted Bohnsack as cre-
ating "a part of the family circle"17 test thereby expanding the
number of situations excluded from the common-law presumption
16. Estate of Bohnsack, 20 Wis. 2d 448, 451, 122 N.W.2d 443, 445 (1963) quoted in In
re Trust of Parsons, 56 Wis. 2d 613, 620, 203 N.W.2d 40, 44 (1973).
17. The court stated its position in the following terms:
We read the Bohnsack Case as in actuality making the test as to presumed intent of
a testator to be whether the illegitimate child was or was not "a part of the family
circle."
In re Trust of Parsons, 56 Wis. 2d 613, 620, 203 N.W.2d 40, 44 (1973).
1973]
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as discussed in Kaufer. Given this premise, the court concluded
that Alan Timothy Parsons, the illegitimate child, was clearly
within the "family circle" consisting of the father, mother and
children, and that his inclusion as part of the "family circle" satis-
fied the primary element of the test established in Bohnsack as this
court intrepreted that decision.
In reference to the element of knowledge which seemed to exist
in Bohnsack, the court stated:
However wide the "family circle," the grandmother could not be
a member when the child joined it for the reason that she was
no longer alive. We do not see the fact of the grandmother leav-
ing the earthly scene before the birth of her grandchild as in any
way affecting the entirely sound Bohnsack reasoning that an
illegitimate child who was "a part of the family circle" was to
be considered outside the common-law presumption. Knowledge
vanishes as an appropriate additional test, where the Grim
Reaper has made a testator's knowing of the existence of the
child impossible. Since we deal solely with what the grandmother
here intended, we see no valid reason for suspecting, much less
presuming, that she intended to exclude from her reference to the
children of her son a grandchild who was a member of the "fam-
ily circle." [Emphasis added]"
Having disposed of the element of knowledge in this manner,
the court was free to conclude that the common-law presumption
that the testatrix intended to include only the legitimate children
of Alan Trubshaw Parsons by her reference to the "children" of
her son was sufficiently rebutted by mere compliance with the
"family circle" element of Bohnsack. In the court's view, this con-
clusion could be interpreted as an extension of Bohnsack;19 how-
ever, it is questionable whether the Parsons case represents an
intentional extension of the previous status of the law or whether
it represents an erroneous interpretation and misapplication of a
previously sound decision.
Initially it appears that the court may have erred when it con-
cluded that Bohnsack represented an unqualified expansion of the
Kaufer case. As noted earlier, Kaufer indicated that the common-
law presumption could be rebutted by showing that the testator
knew at the time the will was executed or republished that the only
potential beneficiaries were illegitimate children. Subsequently, the
18. Id. at 621, 203 N.W.2d at 44.
19. Id. at 622, 203 N.W.2d at 44.
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court in Bohnsack rejected this single element test and stated that
in addition to the testator's knowledge of the existence of the illegi-
timate children, the illegitimates must also be part of the family
circle of the testator or be otherwise recognized by the testator as
an object of his natural bounty. It is apparent that the court in
Bohnsack did reject the Kaufer test relating to situations where the
only potential beneficiaries were illegitimates or would be taking
through illegitimates, and in this respect, Bohnsack may have ex-
panded the number of situations in which the presumption could
be rebutted; however, the court at the same time added to this
modified concept of knowledge a requirement that one of two
alternative conditions be met in conjunction with the knowledge
element. It was this dual element test which the court ignored in
Parsons. In fact, the court concluded that in actuality Bohnsack
made the controlling test as to the intent of the testator to be
whether the illegitimate child was or was not "a part of the family
circle." 20
In light of the developments of the Wisconsin law in this area
and particularly the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinions in
Kaufer and Bohnsack, the conclusions reached in Parsons would
seem to indicate that the court was primarily concerned with reach-
ing a superficially equitable result notwithstanding the apparent
lack of authority for its position. The court attempted to rely on a
liberal reading of the opinion in Bohnsack; however, as was indi-
cated earlier, that decision can not supply the necessary precedent
for the conclusions reached in Parsons. Although Justice Hansen,
writing for the court in Parsons, conceded that this decision may
be deemed an extension of Bohnsack,2 it may perhaps be more
properly viewed as establishing an entirely new test which substan-
tially reduces the effects of the common-law presumption. This
alternative interpretation arises from and seems to be
substantiated by the following three aspects of the court's opinion:
(1) the court excluded the element of knowledge in situations
where the testator's death makes his knowledge of the existence of
illegitimate children impossible;
(2) the court concluded that the test to be applied to determine
the intent of the testator is whether or not the illegitimate child was
"a part of the family circle"; 22 and
20. Id. at 620, 203 N.W.2d at 44.
21. Id. at 622, 203 N.W.2d at 44.
22. Note that the court in Parsons considered the inclusion of the illegitimate child in
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(3) the court frequently referred to the question before it as one
to determine what must have been the testatrix's presumed intent;
whereas, the common-law and the cases prior to Parsons firmly
established that the presumed intent of the testator was to include
only legitimate children, and the task of the court was to determine
whether the testator's language or the surrounding circumstances
necessitated a contrary finding.23
III. EFFECTS ON WILL CONSTRUCTION
As indicated at the beginning of this article, the mere use of the
word "children" in a will without any modification or clarification
may give rise to a question of interpretation at the time of the
testator's death depending on the existence or nonexistence of ille-
gitimate children at the time the will was executed or amended, at
the time for the testator's death, or at a time subsequent to the
death of the testator. Therefore, in conjunction with the foregoing
discussin relative to the Wisconsin Supreme Court's treatment of
the common-law presumption and its application to the construc-
tion of the word "child" or "children," it should be noted that two
apparently fundamental principles of will construction and word
interpretation have been substantially ignored by the court.
The two principles relate to the presumed knowledge of the
testator as to the meaning of the words used in his will, and the
court's duty to ascertain the intent of the testator in light of the
circumstances surrounding him at the time his will was executed.
The court's consideration and application of these two principles
would seem to be essential to provide a basis for a complete deter-
mination of the testator's intent. Although the cases related to the
construction of the word "child" or "children" prior to Parsons
the primary beneficiary's family circle; whereas, in Bohnsack reference was made to the
family circle of the testatrix.
23. The court's reference to finding the testatrix' presumed intent gives rise to a question
as to whether the court merely established a new test to determine intent or whether the
presumption itself has undergone some modification which would permit the common-law
presumption to be set aside by a mere presumption of a contrary intent rather than by an
affirmative showing that the testator intended to include illegitimate children.
Consistent with this point is the fact that the court in Parsons frequently indicated that
there was no showing under the circumstances that the testatrix intended to exclude the
illegitimate child. These statements seem to indicate a change in the nature of the evidence
upon which the court is willing to rely to make a determination of the testator's intent. It
now appears that evidence establishing the testator's intent to exclude illegitimates may be
required; whereas prior to this time an illegitimate child claiming an interest as a "child"
within the meaning of the will was required to show that the testator intended to include
illegitimate children in the bequest.
[Vol. 57
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made no explicit reference to these elements of will construction,
the court's awareness of their existence and application seemed to
be reflected in the opinions and ultimate holdings.24 Before pro-
ceeding to a discussion of the relationship between the decision in
Parsons and the application or non-application of these two prin-
ciples, some background information should be provided to illus-
trate the strength and importance of these two will construction
concepts.
In Estate of Rhodes,2 the Wisconsin Supreme Court made the
following statement in reference to the presumed knowledge of a
testator in relation to the words used in his will:
It is presumed that every word of a will is used advisedly and
with its ordinary meaning. It is the duty of the court first to read
the will giving ordinary meaning to its words and, if this produces
a plain result, that result must prevail and be taken to express
the testator's intent.26
Note, however, that this "ordinary meaning" presumption must be
considered in conjunction with the court's concern for the effects
of the circumstances surrounding the testator on the meaning of
the words used in the will. Perhaps the best statement of this
principle can be found in Estate of Breese:21
Language in a will is used by a testator in reference to known
surrounding circumstances. Specific words and phrases used by
one testator in view of particular circumstances may have a ma-
terially different meaning or at least a different shade of thought
content or of meaning than the same phrases or words used by
another testator under different circumstances.
Words are but arbitrary verbal or written containers carrying
such thought or meaning as is placed therein by their user. The
construction of a will by a court is the ascertainment of that
content or the meaning of the words, i.e., the intention of the
testator. To do this the court attempts to place itself in the posi-
24. See Will of Scholl, 100 Wis. 650, 76 N.W. 616 (1898), Will of Kaufer, 203 Wis.
299, 234 N.W. 504 (1931), and Estate of Bohnsack, 20 Wis. 2d 448, 122 N.W.2d 443 (1963),
where the court recognized the "ordinary meaning" attached to the word "children," the
existence and affect of the common-law presumption, the knowledge of the testator as to
the existence of illegitimate children, and the importance of the general circumstances
surrounding the testator when his will was executed and its relationship to his knowledge
and intent.
25. 271 Wis. 342, 73 N.W.2d 602 (1955); see also Estate of McDonald, 20 Wis. 2d 63,
121 N.W.2d 245 (1963), and 57 Am. JUR. Wills §§ 1162 (1948).
26. 271 Wis. 342, 345, 73 N.W.2d 602, 604 (1955).
27. 7 Wis. 2d 422, 96 N.W.2d 712 (1959).
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tion of the testator when he made his will and to consider the use
of the words in relation to the surrounding circumstances. Will
of Ehlers (1913), 155 Wis. 46, 143 N. W. 1050; see also Will of
Klinkert (1955), 270 Wis. 362, 71 N. W. (2d) 279. [Emphasis
added]8
It is apparent from the cases related to will constructions in
Wisconsin that the court has a duty to construe the words of a will
so as to give effect to the testator's intention by ascertaining that
intention from the language of the will itself in the light of the
circumstances surrounding the testator at the time the will was
executed. The cases in Wisconsin have uniformly established that
the critical time of inquiry for the purposes of construction is the
time at which the will was executed or amended. 9 This requirement
is essential if the court is to establish the true intent of the testator,
since consideration of law or circumstances subsequent to the
death of the testator would require speculation by the court absent
28. Id. at 426, 96 N.W.2d at 716.
29. In relation to these points, note the following statements from several Wisconsin
cases:
One must always look to the will to be construed to determine its meaning, having
due regard to the existence of any statute or legal principle of the unwritten law or
other circumstance which the testator may have had in mind at the time of expressing
his testamentary wishes, which will aid in reading the language from the standpoint
of the testator when he used it.
Lichter v. Thiers, 139 Wis. 481, 486, 121 N.W. 153, 155 (1909);
In construing a will the purpose of the court is to ascertain the intent of the testator
as it is expressed in the full and complete will read in the light of the circumstances
surrounding the testator at the time the will was executed.
Estate of Breese, 7 Wis. 2d 422, 426, 96 N.W.2d 712, 715 (1959);
We pointed out. . . that although a will speaks as of the time of death, the language
is to be interpreted in light of the circumstances surrounding the testator at the time
the will is written.
Estate of Gehl, 39 Wis. 2d 206, 213, 159 N.W.2d 72, 75 (1968);
The intention will be determined from the language of the will, together with any
surrounding or extrinsic circumstances known to the testatrix at the time of the
execution of the will. . . . We are thus obliged to rely upon the statutory and case
law in effect at the time of the will's execution to determine the testatrix' intent, for
it is assumed, in the absence of other compelling circumstances, that the meaning
the testatrix placed upon words used in her will was indentical with the approved
legal meaning at that time.
Will of Mitchell, 50 Wis. 2d, 499, 504, 505, 184 N.W.2d 853, 856 (1971). For similar
authority see: Estate of Mangel, 51 Wis. 2d 55, 186 N.W.2d 276 (1971), Will of Boerner,
46 Wis. 2d 183, 174 N.W.2d 457 (1970), Will of Wehr, 36 Wis. 2d 154, 152 N.W.2d 868
(1967), Will of Adler, 30 Wis. 2d 250, 140 N.W.2d 219 (1966), Estate of McDonald, 20
Wis. 2d 63, 121 N.W.2d 245 (1963), Estate of Budd, 11 Wis. 2d 248, 105 N.W.2d 358 (1960),
Estate of Buser, 8 Wis. 2d 40, 98 N.W.2d 425 (1959), Will of Parker, 273 Wis. 29, 76
N.W.2d 712 (1956), Will of Borck, 160 Wis. 577, 152 N.W. 155 (1915), and 4 W. Bowe
and D. Parker, Page On Wills §§ 30.8, 30.27 (rev. ed. 1961).
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some clear expression in the will permitting consideration of such
factors. The court in Will of MitchelP expressed its position on
this subject by the following concise but illustrative statement:
The object of a court in construing a will is to ascertain the
testator's intent at the time it was executed. Accordingly, the
current statutory law and public policy is irrelevant. [Emphasis
added]"3
In light of the substantial authority establishing the guidelines
for determining the intent of a testator, it is surprising that the
court in Parsons failed to recognize the existence and applicability
of these principles. Perhaps what is even more surprising, is the
fact that the court succeeded in reaching a conclusion that seems
to be in conflict with these established standards.
Referring again to the Will of Scholl, the court there recog-
nized that the plain, ordinary meaning of the word "children" was
still, presumptively, legitimate children. Coupling this principle
with the court's subsequent declarations that a testator is presumed
to use the words in his will in their ordinary meaning as determined
at the time the will was executed, it would appear that there is a
substantial burden which must be overcome before the court would
be permitted to declare these compatable presumptions rebutted.
By reading these two presumptions, it would seem reasonable to
conclude that at the time Maude A. Parsons executed her will the
word "children" had an established "ordinary meaning" as well as
a substantial legal meaning both of which she was presumed to be
aware of when she used the word "children" in her will. However,
it must be conceded that these presumptions are not conclusive,
and the court must take into consideration the surrounding circum-
stances known to the testator at the time he executed or attached
a codicil to his will. It is the consideration of these circumstances
which is required before the court can conclude that the common-
law presumption has been rebutted.
The court in Parsons did in fact consider some surrounding
circumstances, but its analysis focused on the wrong period of time
and ignored the necessity of retaining as a part of its test the
element of knowledge on the part of the testator as to the existence
of the illegitimate children. As noted earlier, the surrounding cir-
cumstances at the time the will was executed are the relevant con-
30. 50 Wis. 2d 499, 184 N.W.2d 853 (1971).
31. Id. at 508, 184 N.W.2d at 857.
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siderations;32 however, the court in Parsons restricted its view to
the circumstances subseqtent to the testatrix's death by limiting its
consideration to the "family circle" element and eliminating the
knowledge requirement.
Prior to Parsons both Kaufer and Bohnsack deemed it neces-
sary for the testator to have knowledge of the existence of the
illegitimate children. The recognition of this necessity apparently
arose sub silentio from the case law in Wisconsin establishing, as
an essential element of will construction, the consideration of the
circumstances known to the testator at the time he executed his
will. By eliminating the element of knowledge, the court in Parsons
has made a significant deviation from the will construction princi-
ples alluded to above. It is submitted that this deviation led to an
improper holding in the Parsons case, since it permitted the court
to conclude that the common-law presumption had been rebutted
by evidence previously insufficient to sustain such a finding.
The impropriety of this result is apparent if one considers the
conscious or unconscious reliance a testator may have placed upon
his surrounding circumstances as he perceived them at the time he
executed his will. Also to be considered is the potential, if not
probable, reliance of a testator on the status of the law at the time
he executed or amended his will. The uncertainty created by the
Parsons decision was neither necessary nor justifiable. As indicated
earlier, the court lacked precedent for its modification of the
Bohnsack test, and the Mitchell case clearly indicated that the
court is not free to warp the language of a testator in order to
obtain a result which it deems to be just or consistant with contem-
porary public policy. It would seem that the court could have
resolved the conflict between the common-law presumption and
will construction principles on the one side and its desire to amelio-
rate the potential harshness of the common-law presumption on
the other. A decision which would have made the court's modifica-
tion of the Bohnsack case prospective would have permitted the
court to comply with the principles of will construction, as herein
outlined, thereby giving effect to the testatrix's intention while at
the same time safeguarding the interests of illegitimate children in
the future. It must be remembered that the primary concern of the
court is to give effect to the testator's intention not to circumvent
that intention to reach a conclusion that is merely consistant with
its interpretation of contemporary trends or public policy.
32. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the common-law presumption that the word "child"
or "children" when used in a will means only a legitimate child or
legitimate children has no place in today's society. Yet, there must
be a starting point for the determination of the testator's intent and
the Wisconsin Supreme Court seems content to at least recognize
the presumption for that limited purpose. It is apparent from the
court's decision in Parsons that the common-law presumption has
been substantially weakened, if not destroyed, by the elimination
of the testator's knowledge as a factor in determining intent. The
court's recognition of the common-law as creating a presumption
that the testator intended to exclude illegitimate children as a nega-
tive statement of the presumption, further weakens the applicabil-
ity and effect of the common-law rule.
If in fact the changes which are asserted in this article have
occurred, what are their effects? It would appear that reliance upon
the common-law presumption is no longer adequate to establish a
testamentary transfer to only legitimate children by the use of the
word "children"; therefore, a will draftsman must now clearly
express the testator's intent in the instrument itself to accomplish
this end. The word "child" or "children" will now require some
modification to insure an uncontested distribution when illegiti-
mate children were or are potential beneficiaries. Perhaps a logical
solution to the potential ambiguity of the word "children" would
be legislation defining the term for the purpose of testamentary
dispositions.3 In this manner, the legislature could express the
contemporary public interests in this area and secure the interests
of the illegitimate children without leaving the door open to litiga-
tion.
WILLIAM E. TAIBL
33. Note that Wis. Stat. § 852.05 (1971), defines the status of illegitimates for the
purpose of intestate succession. There is little reason why similar legislation could not be
adopted to adequately define the status of illegitimates for the purpose of testamentary
dispositions. Note also that Wis. Stat. § 851.51 (3) (1971), has defined the status of adopted
persons for the purposes of gifts by will to a class "... described as issue, lawful issue,
children, grandchildren . . . or the like.
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EDITOR'S NOTE
As a continuing service to the Wisconsin practitioner, the
Marquette Law Review is proud to publish this supplement to the
PROPOSED WISCONSIN RULES OF EVIDENCE. This sup-
plement contains the revisions to the Proposed Rules promulgated
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court on June 5, 1973. The Judicial
Council Committee has revised some of the Notes in the original
text of the Proposed Rules, and such revisions are also contained
herein. Finally, this supplement contains corrections of errors
which were discovered in the text of the original Proposed Rules.
Any changes in the black-letter rules and the Judicial Council
Committee's Notes are indicated by insertions into the original
text of the Proposed Rules. Corrections of errors in the original
text are found in an Errata section at the end of the supplement.
Substantial revisions have occurred in Section 904.10 relating
to the inadmissibility of offers to plead guilty, no contest pleas and
withdrawal of guilty pleas; Section 905.04 relating to physician-
patient privileges; Section 905.05 relating to husband-wife privi-
leges; Section 905.08 relating to privileges for trade secrets; and
Section 906.01 relating to the general rule of competency. Section
905.09 has been created establishing a privilege for law enforce-
ment records.
It is hoped that by this supplement the Wisconsin attorney will
now have a complete compact research tool which will aid him in
answering any evidenciary questions that may arise in his daily
practice.
BOARD OF EDITORS
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SUPPLEMENT TO THE PROPOSED
WISCONSIN RULES OF EVIDENCE
Section 901.03
JUDICIAL COUNCIL COMMITTEE'S NOTE
Sub. (1)
Insert after the first sentence the following:
In State v. Wold, 57 Wis. 2d 344, 204 N.W.2d 482 (1973) the court
said: "The test of harmless error is not whether some harm has
resulted, but, rather, whether the appellate court in its independent
determination can conclude there is sufficient evidence, other than
and uninfluenced by the inadmissible evidence, which would con-
vict the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. See Harrington v.
California, (1969), 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed. 2d 284.
Although the court in Fahy v. Connecticut, (1963), 375 U.S. 85,
84 S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed. 2d 171, had talked about reasonable possi-
bilities, Harrington shows the court no longer in fact uses that
standard. A possibility test is the next thing to automatic reversal.
In determining guilt 'beyond a reasonable doubt,' the human mind
should not work on possibilities but on reasonable probabilities."
Section 901.06
JUDICIAL COUNCIL COMMITTEE'S NOTE
Insert new paragraph at the end of Note as follows:
S. 971.12(3) provides for separate trials or severance of
defendants or other appropriate relief if a confession implicates a
co-defendant. A pretrial conference is an appropriate time to con-
sider questions of limited admissibility that may arise at trial.
Section 903.03
JUDICIAL COUNCIL COMMITTEE'S NOTE
Subs. (2) and (3)
Insert new paragraph at the end of Note as follows:
The phraseology of subs. (2) and (3) with reference to sub-
mission of the existence of a presumed fact to the jury does not
require or suggest the use of a special verdict or a general verdict
with a finding of fact although there appears to be no prohibition
to the use of a special verdict in a criminal case. Such phraseology
suggests that the jury is to be informed of the presumption by an
appropriate jury instruction.
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EDITOR'S NOTE
Section 904.07
Add the following to the end of the black-letter rule:
a violation of s. 101.11.
JUDICIAL COUNCIL COMMITTEE'S NOTE
Insert new paragraph at the end of Note as follows:
Evidence of subsequent remedial measures is admissible in
safe-place cases to establish that the premises were not as safe as
the nature of the place would reasonably permit. Raim v. Ventura,
16 Wis. 2d 67, 113 N.W.2d 827 (1962); Zehren v. F. W. Woolworth
Co., 11 Wis. 2d 539, 105 N.W.2d 563 (1960); Heiden v.
Milwaukee, 226 Wis. 92, 275 N.W. 922 (1937); Sweitzer v. Fox,
226 Wis. 26, 275 N.W. 546 (1937).
Section 904.08
JUDICIAL COUNCIL COMMITTEE'S NOTE
Insert into line 2 on page 224 after the word "court" the
following:
or to the prosecuting attorney (s. 904.10)
Section 904.10
Insert new black-letter Rule as follows:
Evidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or a plea of no
contest, or of an offer to the court or prosecuting attorney to plead
guilty or no contest to the crime charged or any other crime, or in
civil forfeiture actions, is not admissible in any civil or criminal
proceeding against the person who made the plea or offer or one
liable for his conduct. Evidence of statements made in court or to
the prosecuting attorney in connection with any of the foregoing
pleas or offers is not admissible.
JUDICIAL COUNCIL COMMITTEE'S NOTE
Insert new sentence in line 5 page 227 after the word "guilty"
as follows:
Out-of-court statements other than those which are offers to
the court or to the prosecuting attorney are admissible in evidence
and not within the proscription of this section.
Section 904.12
Eliminate last sentence of Sub. (2) of the black-letter rule.
Insert new Sub. (3) as follows:
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(3) This section does not apply to any statement taken by
any officer having the power to make arrests.
JUDICIAL COUNCIL COMMITTEE'S NOTE
Add new sentence and new paragraph to the end of Note as
follows:
This rule recognizes that admissions are not hearsay but draws on
the enumerated hearsay exceptions to describe the kinds of admis-
sions that are not subject to the 72 hour rule.
Subsection (3) is created to make sure that the reader under-
stands that neither subsection (1) nor subsection (2) applies to any
statement taken by any officer having the power to make arrests
as was originally decided by case law in connection with subsection
(1) as well as by the legislature in later enacting subsection (2).
Section 905.01
Insert after the word "inherent" in black-letter rule the
words "or implicit".
JUDICIAL COUNCIL COMMITTEE'S NOTE
Insert in line 29 page 237 after the word "inherent" the
words "or implicit".
Insert in line 30 page 237 after the word "rule" the words
"and the interpretations of s. 19.21 are unaffected".
Eliminate last paragraph of Note on page 238 and at end
of preceding paragraph insert the following:
Public policy favors the production of public records and
documents and nonproduction is justified only if the custodian's
specific reasons for refusal to inspect establish that the harm done
to the public interest by inspection outweighs the right of a member
of the public to access. The public's right to inspect public docu-
ments remains subject to a judicial determination whether the pub-
lic interest outweights the right of a member of the public to have
access to a particular document. The privilege provided by s.
905.09 is subject to s. 19.21 and the procedure implementing it by
virtue of the phrase in s. 905.09 "to the extent available by law to
a person other than the federal government, or state or subdivision
thereof."
Section 905.02
Remove words "if the law requiring it to be made so
provides", in line 4 of black-letter rule and insert the words "if
provided by law".
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EDITOR'S NOTE
Make the same change in line 7 of black-letter rule.
JUDICIAL COUNCIL COMMITTEE'S NOTE
Insert after the first paragraph of Note the following:
Substitution of the phrase "if provided by law" for the provision
of the Federal Rule "if the law requiring it to be made so provides"
is designed to assure that the privilege arising by virtue of this rule
may originate in the statute requiring the report or return or in
another statute that is in pari materia.
Section 905.04
Insert new black-letter rule as follows:
905.04 PHYSICIAN - PATIENT
PRIVILEGE (1) DEFINITIONS.
(a) A "patient" is a person who consults or is examined or
interviewed by a physician.
(b) A "physician" is a person as defined in s. 990.01(28), or
reasonably believed by the patient so to be.
(c) A communication or information is "confidential" if not
intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those
present to further the interest of the patient in the consulta-
tion, examination, or interview, or persons reasonably
necessary for the transmission of the communication or
information or persons who are participating in the diagno-
sis and treatment under the direction of the physician,
including the members of the patient's family.
(2) GENERAL RULE OF PRIVILEGE. A patient has a privi-
lege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person
from disclosing confidential communications made or
information obtained or disseminated for purposes of
diagnosis or treatment of his physical, mental or emotional
condition, among himself, his physician, or persons, includ-
ing members of the patient's family, who are participating
in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the
physician.
(3) WHO MAY CLAIM THE PRIVILEGE. The privilege may
be claimed by the patient, by his guardian or conservator,
or by the personal representative of a deceased patient.
The person who was the physician may claim the privilege
but only on behalf of the patient. His authority so to do is
presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
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(4) EXCEPTIONS.
(a) Proceedings for Hospitalization. There is no privilege
under this rule as to communications and information
relevant to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient
for mental illness, if the physician in the course of diagno-
sis or treatment has determined that the patient is in need
of hospitalization.
(b) Examination by Order of Judge. If the judge orders an
examination of the physical, mental or emotional condi-
tion of the patient, communications made in the course
thereof are not privileged under this section with respect
to the particular purpose for which the examination is
ordered unless the judge orders otherwise.
(c) Condition an Element of Claim or Defense. There is no
privilege under this section as to communications relevant
to or within the scope of discovery examination of an issue
of the physical, mental or emotional condition of a patient
in any proceedings in which he relies upon the condition
as an element of his claim or defense, or, after the pa-
tient's death, in any proceeding in which any party relies
upon the condition as an element of his claim or defense.
(d) Homicide Trials. There is no privilege in trials for
homicide when the disclosure relates directly to the facts
or immediate circumstances of the homicide.
(e) Abused or Injured Child. There is no privilege in
situations where the examination of an abused or injured
child creates a reasonable ground for an opinion of the
physician that the condition was other than accidentally
caused or inflicted by another.
JUDICIAL COUNCIL COMMITTEE'S NOTE
Insert new Note on page 251 as follows:
Rule 504 of the Proposed Federal Rules does not recognize
a physician-patient privilege and is specifically limited to a psy-
chotherapist. The Wisconsin draft of Rule 504 maintains most of
the present concepts of Wis. Stat. s. 885.21 (Communications to
Doctors). This section differs from the Proposed Federal Rule: (1)
by not extending the privilege to confidential communications
made to a psychologist practicing psychotherapy; (2) by continuing
a general physician-patient privilege that applies to the practice of
medicine generally and is not limited to psychotherapy.
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EDITOR'S NOTE
Sub. (1)(a). The same patient relationship that existed under
Wis. Stat. s. 885.21 is maintained.
Replace Note (c) on page 252 with the following:
(c). Wisconsin is in accord with this definition as it applies
to confidential communication or information, s. 885.21, however,
a broader approach is taken in that disclosure to persons such as
consulting physicians, nurses, hospital staff or members of the
family would not negate the privilege, if such disclosure would
further the interest of the patient.
Replace Note (2) on page 253 with the following:
(2). Wisconsin is in accord with respect to the application
of this subsection to a physician Wis. Stat. s. 885.21. The subsec-
tion expands the privilege to persons participating in diagnosis and
treatment, such as nurses, resident physicians, medical technolo-
gists and family members, as long as these persons are participat-
ing in the diagnosis and treatment.
Replace Note (4)(a) on page 254 with the following:
Sub. (4)
(a) Proposed Federal Rule 504(d)(1) is adopted and ex-
panded to a physician generally. Wisconsin is in accord. Wis. Stat.
s. 885.21(l)(b).
Section 905.05
Insert new black-letter rule as follows:
(1) GENERAL RULE OF PRIVILEGE. A person has a privi-
lege to prevent his spouse or former spouse from testifying
against him as to any private communication by one to the
other made during their marriage.
(2) WHO MAY CLAIM THE PRIVILEGE. The privilege may
be claimed by the person or by the spouse on his behalf. The
authority of the spouse to do so is presumed in the absence
of evidence to the contrary.
(3) EXCEPTIONS. There is no privilege under this rule:
(a) If both spouses or former spouses are parties to the
action.
(b) In proceedings in which one spouse or former spouse
is charged with a crime against the person or property of the
other or of a child of either, or with a crime against the
person or property of a third person committed in the course
of committing a crime against the other.
(c) In proceedings in which a spouse or former spouse is
charged with a crime of pandering or prostitution.
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(d) If one spouse or former spouse has acted as the agent
of the other and the private communication relates to mat-
ters within the scope of the agency.
Insert new JUDICIAL COUNCIL COMMITTEE'S NOTE as fol-
lows:
Sub.(l). This section is generally a restatement of s. 885.18,
which is repealed, and is a substantial departure from the Proposed
Federal Rule. The principal differences are: (1) this section applies
to civil and criminal actions; (2) this section continues the former
statute applicability to private communications made during the
marriage; (3) this section applies the privilege to such communica-
tions although the marriage has been terminated.
Sub.(2). The federal rule is .adopted. Wisconsin is in ac-
cord, s. 885.21.
Sub.(3). Exception (a) prevents the exercise of a privilege
to defeat inter-spousal rights. Exception (b) follows the Proposed
Federal Rule. The second exception to the Proposed Federal Rule
is omitted as unnecessary because of subsection (1). Exception (c)
is consistent with the third exception to the Proposed Federal Rule.
Exception (d) follows the present Wisconsin statute.
Section 905.08
Insert new black-letter rule as follows:
A person has a privilege, which may be claimed by him or his
agent or employee, to refuse to disclose and to prevent other persons
from disclosing a trade secret, owned by him, if the allowance of the
privilege will not tend to conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice.
When disclosure is directed, the judge shall take such protective
measure as the interests of the holder of the privilege and of the
parties and the furtherance of justice may require.
Insert new JUDICIAL COUNCIL COMMITTEE'S NOTE as fol-
lows:
Wisconsin does not have a comparable statutory privilege
although s. 943.205 establishes a crime for the disclosure of a trade
secret. Case law recognizes a cause of action for damages for the
misappropriation of trade secrets. Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. For-
mulations, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 202 (E.D. Wis. 1969); Besley-Welles
Corp. v. Balax, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 328 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Bendix
Corp. v. Balax, Inc., 421 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1970); Abbot Labora-
tories v. Norse Chemical Corp., 33 Wis. 2d 445, 147 N.W.2d 559
(1967).
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EDITOR'S NOTE
Section 905.09 is created as follows:
The federal government or a state or a subdivision thereof has
a privilege to refuse to disclose investigatory files, reports and re-
turns for law enforcement purposes except to the extent available
by law to a person other than the federal government, a state or
subdivision thereof. The privilege may be claimed by an appropriate
representative of the federal government, a state or a subdivision
thereof.
JUDICIAL COUNCIL COMMITTEE'S NOTE
This section has no direct parallel in the proposed federal
rule 509. A privilege for law enforcement files and records is estab-
lished by this section. However, the privilege is qualified by the
phrase "to the extent available by law" to preserve the supremacy
of s. 19.21 permitting examination of public records and docu-
ments. The burden is upon the person claiming the privilege to
establish in a judicial determination that the public interest out-
weighs the right of a member of the public to have access to
claimed privileged material in the fashion prescribed in Youmans
v. Owens, 28 Wis. 2d 672, 137 N.W.2d 672 (1965) and Beckon v.
Emery, 36 Wis. 2d 510, 153 N.W.2d 501 (1967). Normally, the
"appropriate representative" to make the claim will be counsel,
however, it is possible that disclosure of the privileged material will
be sought in proceedings to which the government, state or subdivi-
sion, as the case may be, is not a party. Under these circumstances,
effective implementation of the privilege requires that other repre-
sentatives be considered "appropriate".
Section 906.01
Insert new black-letter rule as follows:
Every person is competent to be a witness except as provided
by ss. 885.16 and 885.17 or as otherwise provided in these rules.
JUDICIAL COUNCIL COMMITTEE'S NOTE
Insert in line 39, page 278 after the word "law" the phrase
"(although the Dead Man's Statutes survive)".
Remove last paragraph of Note on page 279 and replace it
with the following:
S. 885.13 is repealed for the reason stated above. S. 885.19
is repealed because s. 906.01 assures competency of a witness con-
victed of a criminal offense; the balance of the statute providing
for impeachment is covered in s. 906.09.
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The question of the survival of the Dead Man's Statutes, ss.
885.16 and 885.17 is left to the Legislature. See Estate of Molay,
46 Wis. 2d 450, 175 N.W.2d 254 (1970); Comment, Evidence Law
in Wisconsin: Towards a More Practical Rationale and Codified
Approach, 1970 WIs. L. REV. 1178, 1194.
Section 906.14
JUDICIAL COUNCIL COMMITTEE'S NOTE
Add to Note Sub. (1) the following:
It is expected that this authority will be used only in the exceptional
case.
Add to Note Sub. (2) the following:
It is expected that this authority will be used only in the exceptional
case.
Section 908.03
JUDICIAL COUNCIL COMMITTEE'S NOTE
Replace Note Sub. (15) with the following:
See comment to Exception (14). This provision is a specific
illustration of the original common law ancient document rule. See
s. 908.03(16). The common law rule is changed by elimination of
the requirement that the document be ancient or the declarant
unavailable, or that the dealings with the property are consistent
with the statement. If there is proof of dealings inconsistent with
the statement, the statement is not admissible under this rule. By
eliminating the time and availability requirements, the statement
in the document as well as the testimony of the declarant or other
witnesses may now be received in evidence. Trustworthiness of the
statement seems assured by relevance, contemporaneity with the
transaction, subsequent consistent dealings and the probability
that the statement will have been made before the controversy
arose. Note that delivery is not evidenced by the original deed
under this provision unless a statement to that effect is contained
therein; however, it can be proved by the record of the deed under
s. 908.03 (14).
Section 908.045
JUDICIAL COUNCIL COMMITTEE'S NOTE
Sub. (3)
Remove second paragraph of Note and replace with the fol-
lowing:
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EDITOR'S NOTE
Where unavailability of the declarant is caused by death,
there are no confrontation problems. State v. Dickinson, 41 Wis.
299, 308 (1877); Federal Advisory Committee Note to s.
908.045(1). With the expanded definition of unavailability in s.
908.04, confrontation problems may arise.
ERRATA TO PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE
1. On page 158, Line 26 after the word "evidence", insert Schey
Enterprises v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 361, 370, 190 N.W.2d 149, 155
(1971).
2. On page 180, the Federal Advisory Committee's Note should
be directly under § 902.02 on the next page.
3. On page 213, line 35, the correct cite to Parham v. State is 53
Wis. 2d 458, 192 N.W.2d 838 (1972).
4. On page 257, Line 12, remove reference to Wis. STATS. and
(1969).
5. On page 259, Line 10, "charter" should read "character"
6. On page 268, Lines 28-30 should read "i.e., the informer him-
self, is something of a novelty in the law of privilege; if the informer
chooses to reveal his identity, further efforts to suppress it are
scarcely possible".
7. On page 286, Line 19, "district" should read "direct".
8. On page 306, Line 5, "[See, s. 908.03(2)(e)]" should read
"[See, s. 908.03(5)]".
9. On page 316, Line 9, citation "29 Wis. 2d 55, 117 N.W. 2d
646 (1962)" should read "18 Wis. 2d 67, 117 N.W.2d 646 (1962)".
10. On page 332, Line 7, "908.04" should read "908.045."
11. On page 352, Line 1, after "as" insert "proof".
12. On page 385, Line 4, "906.03" should read "906.08".
13. On page 385, Line 25, "s. 908.045(s)" should read "s.
908.045(5)".
14. On page 389, Line 23, "ability" should read "probability".
15. On page 391, Line 30, "capability" should read "incapabil-
ity".
16. On page 394, Line 10, "sub.(b)(1)" should read "s.
908.045(1)".
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17. On page 434, Line 28, rule "901.04" should read "910.04".
18. On page 434, Line 34, "NOTE" should read "NOT".
19. On page 448, after 891.021 should be inserted the following:
"891.09(3) (Amend to conform to note following 909.02(3))".
